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Emerging evidence suggests that management control systems may generate positive 
psychological effects, leading to higher levels of managerial performance. We extend 
this literature by examining the extent to which (1) financial vis-à-vis non-financial 
measures and (2) diagnostic vis-à-vis interactive utilisation of performance measures 
may be associated with decreasing role ambiguity and increasing psychological 
empowerment with performance as the ultimate outcome variable. We find that the 
interactive utilisation of non-financial performance measures can be particularly 
important for generating a positive psychological experience and (indirectly) 
increasing performance. Our study contributes further evidence of the psychologically 
beneficial role played by management control systems. 
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Examining a positive role psychological for performance measures 
 
1. Introduction 
While debate continues, reliance on accounting performance measures is generally 
viewed as likely to create unfavourable psychological effects which frequently prove 
to be organizationally dysfunctional (Hartmann, 2000). Financial measures have been 
associated with a range of dysfunctional effects, including: data manipulation 
(Hopwood, 1972), „gaming‟ (Hofstede, 1968), job-related tension (Hopwood, 1972), 
group based negative behaviour (Argyris, 1952), interdepartmental strife (Argyris, 
1960), budgetary slack (Merchant, 1985), and short-termism (Merchant, 1990; Van 
der Stede, 2000). The generally negative perspective towards financially orientated 
performance measures underlies calls for the demise of budgeting (Hope and Fraser, 
2003), and has tended to endure since Argyris‟ (1952; 1953) early observations that 
were encapsulated in the phrase “Human problems with budgets”.   
 
Nevertheless, an emerging body of literature is beginning to examine the potential for 
financially based controls to fulfil a positive psychological role. Hartmann (2005), for 
example, shows how tolerance for ambiguity may moderate how managers view the 
appropriateness of accounting performance measures in conditions of uncertainty; the 
higher the tolerance for ambiguity, the greater the perceived appropriateness of 
accounting as a measure of performance. Marginson (2006) finds that increasing 
reliance on financial information may reduce role ambiguity. Marginson and Ogden 
(2005a, p.437) show that managers may commit to achieving pre-set budgetary targets 
because “doing so offers a sense of clarity and security” within a role subject to 
ambiguity and uncertainty. Marginson and Ogden (2005b) propose that budgets may 
enable managers to feel psychologically empowered. The importance of these studies 
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arises from the improved organisational performance that follows on from positive 
psychological effects (Hall, 2008). 
 
Marginson and Ogden (2005a,b) argue that positive psychological effects are due to 
the relatively clear, concise and unambiguous indicators of performance provided by 
financial measures. They provide empirical evidence to support their position. In 
contrast, Hall‟s (2008) study is consistent with the argument that a broad range of 
measures, incorporating non-financial measures, overcomes the inadequacies of 
traditional narrowly-based financial measures (see Ittner and Larcker, 1998; Ittner, 
Larcker and Meyer, 2003; Lau and Sholihin, 2005; Lau and Moser, 2008; Kaplan and 
Norton, 2001). Hall (2008) examined how „comprehensive performance measurement 
systems (PMS)‟ are related to both psychological empowerment (PE) and role clarity, 
with consequences for managerial performance. Hypotheses are based upon the 
assumption that a comprehensive PMS “provides richer and more complete feedback 
about operations and results ... which is expected to have positive effects” (pg. 144). 
Defining comprehensive PMS in terms of information provision (to assist managers in 
managing firm operations) (Ittner, Larcker and Randall, 2003; Lillis, 2002), Hall 
(2008) reports support for his hypotheses.  
 
Our contribution seeks to explore the differences between Marginson and Ogden 
(2005a,b) and Hall (2008) by providing theoretical and empirical evidence to clarify 
the psychological impact of comprehensive PMS vis-à-vis relatively narrow financial 
measures. We re-specify Hall‟s (2008) concept of comprehensive PMS to explicitly 
address financial and non-financial measures as separate constructs. Both are 
recognised as playing an increasingly important role in PMS (Bhimani and Langfield-
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Smith, 2007; Kaplan and Norton, 2001; Otley, 1999). The assumption that non-
financial performance measures are essential for overcoming the inadequacies of 
financial measures increases the importance of investigating the former alongside the 
latter (Lau and Sholihin, 2005), and leads us to hypothesise different psychological 
effects for financial vis-à-vis non-financial measures.   
 
We also extend the existing literature on the positive psychological effects of PMS by 
investigating the possibility that it may not be the mere existence of performance 
measures, but how such measures are used in a management control context, that 
explains impact. That is, we argue that different types of utilisation generate different 
effects (see Veen-Dirks, 2009; Marginson et al., 2010). We define use of PMS in 
terms of diagnostic control (to monitor performance against pre-set standards) vis-à-
vis interactive control (to encourage dialogue about strategic uncertainties) (Simons, 
1995; 2005). The focus on diagnostic vis-à-vis interactive utilisation extends research 
which shows these are two key organizational roles for performance measures (Henri, 
2006; Widener, 2007). 
 
Our final contribution complements prior research that suggests an intervening role 
for psychological variables: management control systems affect a person‟s 
psychological state, which, in turn, affects performance (Collins, 1982; Luckett and 
Eggleton, 1991). Shields, Deng and Kato (2000) find an intervening psychological 
role that is more significant than a direct relationship between management control 
systems and performance, whilst Hall (2008) finds a full intervening role; PMS are 
observed to affect managerial performance, but only through psychological impacts. 
Hence, role ambiguity and psychological empowerment are affected by PMS 
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(Hopwood, 1972; Hall, 2008), and affect managerial performance (e.g. Dunk, 1993; 
Hall, 2008). We therefore hypothesise an intervening role for role ambiguity and 
psychological empowerment and examine managerial performance as the outcome 
variable. We define managers‟ psychological state in terms of both role ambiguity and 
psychological empowerment, given (1) the implications of both for organizational 
performance (Spreitizer, 1996; Menon, 2001), and (2) research which demonstrates 
their interconnectedness (Spreitzer, 1996; Hall, 2008).   
 
We tested our hypotheses using data collected from a questionnaire survey involving 
284 middle-level managers and yielding 98 usable responses, a response rate of 
34.5%. We find the following. Financial measures affect role ambiguity, but no effect 
is observed for psychological empowerment. Increasing use of non-financial measures 
is associated with both decreased role ambiguity and increased psychological 
empowerment. In contrast to diagnostic utilisation (which is seen to affect only role 
ambiguity), increasing interactive utilisation of performance measures is associated 
with both reduced role ambiguity and higher levels of psychological empowerment. 
Both lower levels of role ambiguity and higher levels of psychological empowerment 
are associated with higher levels of managerial performance. Finally, our results show 
that PMS affects managerial performance indirectly through effects on role ambiguity 
and psychological empowerment. Overall, we contribute evidence to suggest that the 
nature and extent of any positive psychological effects generated by performance 
measures may depend on both the type of measure involved and the style of 
utilisation. Positive psychological effects may arise in particular from the interactive 




The next section develops the study‟s hypotheses. In subsequent sections, we describe 
the research methodology, present the empirical results, and discuss the implications 
and limitations of our study.  
 
2.Hypothesis development 
We first introduce goal theory as a means to develop hypotheses, and we subsequently 
use goal theory to explain our findings in the discussion and conclusions section. 
Following the introduction to goal theory, we hypothesise the psychological effects 
that might be expected to arise from the utilisation of financial vis-à-vis non-financial 
performance measures (model 1) before hypothesising psychological effects 
associated with diagnostic vis-à-vis interactive utilisation of financial and non-
financial measures (model 2). For both models, we hypothesise relationships between 
psychological empowerment, role ambiguity, and managerial performance. 
 
2.1. Goal theory 
Hartmann (2000, pg. 474) argues that accounting performance measures, “should be 
approached as a combination of functional and dysfunctional consequences”; and that 
goal theory may provide a basis for explaining the positive effects that can result from 
using accounting measures as a response to uncertainty. Goal theory is “based upon 
action caused by a purpose” (Locke, 1996: 118). Locke (1996) defines goals as 
objects, such as performance levels, that are intentionally sought by individuals. Goal 
theory is premised on the assumption that individuals calculate outcomes relative to 
effort, and choose to expend effort commensurate with the attainment of attractive (or 
avoidance of unattractive) outcomes (House, 1996; Locke and Latham, 1990). The 
effective pursuit of goals requires feedback as a means to monitor progress towards 
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goal attainment (Locke and Latham, 1990). Feedback on past performance leads to 
further goal setting which is influenced by self-efficacy, or personal belief in the 
ability to attain particular goals (Bandura, 1986; Locke and Latham, 1990). Improved 
performance has been shown by several studies to be the consequence of appropriate 
goal setting and self efficacy (Locke, 1996). Self efficacy is necessary to 
empowerment (Bandura, 1986; Ozer and Bandura, 1990), and goal theory views role 
ambiguity as a stressful and unpleasant experience (House, 1996). 
 
2.2.Role ambiguity and financial measures  
Role ambiguity (RA) refers to a lack of clarity and structure in a role (Kahn, Wolfe, 
Quinn, Snoek and Rosenthal, 1964; House and Rizzo, 1970). Individuals may 
experience RA because of a lack of clarity about what is expected in a role, the 
criteria of evaluation and how evaluation is to be conducted (House, 1996). Sources of 
RA include: environmental turbulence, cross boundary activities, innovative processes, 
and poor communications between superior and subordinate (King and King, 1990). 
RA may manifest in the form of increased physiological stress (Siegall, 2000) and, in 
the limit, RA is injurious to health (Kahn, 1974). 
 
Individuals respond to RA by invoking coping strategies (Kahn et al., 1964). These 
are actions undertaken in an attempt to (re)gain clear, orderly, structured, and 
meaningful cognitive experiences (Kahn et al., 1964; King and King, 1990). Such 
actions are explained by goal theory and the need for the clarification that provides 
psychological structure through clear statements of expectations (House, 1996). 
Marginson and Ogden (2005a) provide evidence consistent with goal theory by 
showing that managers commit to meeting budgetary targets because budgeting can 
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provide structure and clarity to the role to counter RA. In theory, RA is implicated in 
responsibility centres, which help to establish „who is responsible for what‟ (McNally, 
1980). Achieving pre-set budgetary and other financial targets through responsibility 
accounting is normally perceived to contribute to organizational objectives (Merchant 
and Van der Stede, 2007), and, as such, the manager is able to identify the path to a 
positive evaluation. The apparent certainty of accounting numbers (Barratt, Cooper, 
and Jamal, 2005) and the act of setting budgetary targets helps to reinforce clear goals. 
In short, by utilising financial measures, managers may derive structure, certainty and 
clarity to counter the experience of RA (Marginson and Ogden, 2005a). We therefore 
hypothesise that:   
H1: Utilisation of financial measures is negatively related to role ambiguity  
 
2.3. Psychological empowerment and financial measures 
Psychological empowerment (PE) is defined in terms of four factors or dimensions: 
„impact‟, „competence‟, „meaning‟ and 'self-determination‟ (Conger and Kanungo, 
1988; Thomas and Velthouse, 1990; Spreitzer 1995). „Impact‟ is the extent to which 
persons perceive they can „make a difference‟ by influencing what happens within the 
particular work environment (e.g. department, business unit). Being able to „make a 
difference‟ may relate to influencing strategic, administrative, and/or operating 
outcomes at work (Ashforth, 1989; Spreitzer, 1995). Competence refers to self-
efficacy and to belief in the ability to „do the job‟ by performing work activities with 
skill (Gist, 1987). Competence is analogous to mastery of behaviour (Spreitzer, 1995). 
Meaning or meaningfulness represents the value of a work goal or purpose, as 
adjudged by the individual in relation to personal ideals and standards (Thomas and 
Velthouse, 1990). Meaning reflects the extent to which a person cares about a given 
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task for intrinsic reasons and involves a fit between the requirements of a work role 
and an individual‟s beliefs and values (Brief and Nord, 1990; Hackman and Oldham, 
1980). Self-determination refers to an individual‟s sense of having choice in initiating 
and regulating actions, such as making decisions about work methods, pace, and effort 
(Deci, Connell and Ryan, 1989). Self-determination derives from having a sense of 
autonomy in deciding how the job is done (Spreitzer, 1995). 
 
PE is influenced by organizational environment (Siegall and Gardner, 2000), and 
providing managers with relevant performance information will increase feelings of 
PE (Drake, Wong and Salter, 2007; Spreitzer, 1995). Relevant performance 
information is defined as that relating both to an organization‟s mission and to 
information related to individual performance (Thomas and Velthouse, 1990). Both 
types are viewed as critical antecedents to empowerment (Spreitzer, 1995). Both may 
be derived from the utilisation of financial performance measures.  
 
Managers gain a sense of impact because achieving financial targets enables them to 
feel that they make a difference to the achievement of organizational objectives 
(Merchant, 1998). The visibility of accounting information makes managers‟ efforts 
evident to superiors and colleagues (Roberts, 1991), and thus the manager can be seen 
to be contributing to organizational goals. Equally, achieving financial measures 
signals „mastery of behaviour‟ and competence (Marginson and Ogden, 2005b). 
Meaning may be experienced as utilisation of financial measures can suggest an 
individual‟s commitment towards, and intrinsic concern for, organizational aims and 
objectives (Marginson and Ogden, 2005b). Self-determination may be enhanced by 
the choices the manager may make in seeking to ensure the achievement of financial 
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measures. Responsibility accounting systems normally provide managers with a 
degree of independent responsibility and autonomy within their designated area of 
authority (Ezzamel and Hart, 1987). We therefore hypothesise the following: 
H2: Utilisation of financial measures is positively related to the four dimensions of 
psychological empowerment 
 
2.4. Non-financial measures, role ambiguity and psychological empowerment 
A positive impact of non-financial measures is consistent with Hall‟s (2008) analysis 
of the impact of comprehensive PMS on role clarity and PE. We do not rehearse those 
arguments here but develop hypotheses that are both consistent with goal theory and 
the possibility that financial and non-financial measures achieve contradictory effects. 
This leads us to elaborate the possible negative implications of non-financial measures. 
We develop hypotheses that are supported by the management accounting literature, 
and that are consistent with our previous arguments based upon goal theory. We 
present the view that parsimonious measures hold the potential to provide positive 
outcomes, whilst extensive measures may overwhelm users of PMS. Our framing is 
consistent with theory that addresses the consequences of information overload (Kahn 
et al., 1964). We do not presume to ignore the literature that emphasizes positive 
impacts, but we recognise that empirical evidence for both positive and negative 
outcomes is needed to inform existing and future debates on the value of non-financial 
measures (see Nørreklit, 2000). We return to this argument in the discussion and 
conclusions section. 
 
Greater ambiguity indicates greater RA by definition, and managers may view non-
financial measures as being more ambiguous than financial measures (Chow and Van 
der Stede, 2006; Ittner, Larcker and Meyer, 2003). Non-financial measures have been 
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characterised as more subjective and less „factual‟ than financial measures (Lau and 
Buckland, 2001; Ross, 1994). These characteristics suggest greater ambiguity, and 
thereby increased RA. In contrast to the short-term orientation of financial measures 
(Merchant and Van der Stede, 2007), non-financial measures are viewed as future 
orientated (e.g. Ittner, Larcker and Meyer, 2003; Lau and Moser, 2008). A focus on 
the longer-term implies increased uncertainty (Prelec and Loewenstein, 1991: 784). In 
turn, increased uncertainty suggests increasing RA (Marginson and McAulay, 2008). 
Finally, responsibility for non-financial measures may be shared (Meyer, 1994), 
thereby promoting jurisdictional and decisional ambiguity, with concomitant 
consequences for RA and the individual‟s ability to identify appropriate goal 
clarifying behaviour (House, 1996). We therefore hypothesise the following:     
H3: Utilisation of non-financial measures is positively related to role ambiguity 
 
Non-financial measures do not necessarily provide a common yardstick for 
benchmarking and comparison on a wider organizational scale (Meyer, 1996). Rather, 
they tend to relate to specific parts of the organization; and this has been claimed as a 
strength (Kaplan and Norton, 1993; Lipe and Salterio, 2000). Nevertheless, Lipe and 
Salterio (2000) show that managers may be evaluated solely on the basis of common, 
as opposed to specific measures. Unresolved contradictions may therefore arise 
between local divisional PMS, which should be salient but which might lack salience 
in practice, and organisation-wide, or common, PMS. Related to this finding, and 
despite their role as „leading indicators‟ of performance (Kaplan and Norton, 1992; 
2001), improvements due to non-financial measures may be difficult to link to 
organizational goals of profitability (Fisher, 1992; Nørriklit, 2000). Both these 
features may limit the potential for managers to secure and demonstrate a sense of 
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overall organizational impact and competence through the use of non-financial 
measures. Additionally, meaning may be compromised by the multiplicity of non-
financial measures, which may create difficulties in assigning objective value to any 
particular measure(s), because empirical evidence suggests that diversity of 
performance measurement leads to lenient ratings by evaluators and less 
differentiation of managers who are evaluated (Moers, 2005). Non-financial measures 
lose capacity to differentiate between „good‟ and „bad‟ performance over time (Meyer, 
1996), further undermining the potential for managers to gain a sense of meaning via 
utilisation of such measures. The following hypothesis summarises these arguments: 
H4: Utilisation of non-financial measures is negatively related to the four dimensions 
of psychological empowerment 
 
2.5. Diagnostic and interactive utilisation of performance measures, role ambiguity 
and psychological empowerment 
Following Hopwood‟s (1972; 1974) earlier contribution, recent research has 
recognised the importance of examining how performance measures are used (Henri, 
2006; Mundy, 2010; Van Deeks, 2010; Widener, 2007). We next consider how 
diagnostic vis-à-vis interactive utilisation of financial and non-financial performance 
measures may affect RA and PE. As in the case of our hypothesis development for 
non-financial measures, we recognise that we reverse familiar arguments, in this case 
the framing that aligns diagnostic control with dysfunctional consequences and 
interactive control with positive outcomes (Simons, 1995), and we return to the 
arguments in the discussion and conclusion section. 
 
Diagnostic control involves monitoring progress against key performance indicators 
or „critical performance variables‟ (Henri, 2006, p.534; Simons, 2005). It is therefore 
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consistent with feedback and is centrally important to goal theory. Feedback is 
necessary “so that people can get a clear indication if they are moving fast enough and 
in the right direction” (Locke, 1996, pg. 120). Diagnostic control is a form of learning 
entailing single loop feedback through which deviations from pre-set standards of 
performance are corrected (Argyris, 1999; Vandenbosch, 1999; Henri, 2006). Thus, 
diagnostic utilisation (of both financial and non-financial) performance measures can 
provide clear goals, clarity and direction. Direction is achieved because diagnostic 
utilisation is about tracking progress towards goals, monitoring results, reviewing key 
measures, and meeting clearly defined targets (Henri, 2006). Role clarity in particular 
is enhanced because the manager can confidently anticipate a positive evaluation from 
meeting organizationally significant targets or key performance indicators (Marginson 
and Ogden, 2005a). 
 
An observed inverse relationship between RA and PE (Hall, 2008; Spretizer, 1996) 
suggests that, if diagnostic utilisation of performance measures reduces RA, the same 
diagnostic utilisation should increase PE. Although we do not hypothesise the 
relationship between RA and PE, because it is not directly relevant to our research 
question, the following arguments ensue.  
 
Diagnostic utilisation has the potential to provide managers with the type of 
performance information which is predicted to increase feelings of PE. As achieving 
organizationally significant key performance indicators (KPIs) demonstrates „making 
a difference‟, single-loop feedback about target achievement may help the manager 
secure a sense of impact. Diagnostic utilisation of performance measures enables the 
manager to achieve a sense of competence where success in meeting targets signals 
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mastery of behaviour and an „ability to achieve‟ (Marginson and Ogden, 2005a). 
Meaning may be experienced as increasing diagnostic utilisation of organizationally 
significant KPIs suggests self-evaluation by reference to the apparent objectivity of 
financial and similar numeric targets (Roberts, 1991). Self-determination may be 
enhanced by the choices the manager may make through the discretion which 
accompanies the operation of responsibility accounting (Ezzamel and Hart, 1987). 
Finally, Ogden et al. (2006) show that managers value increased accountability, based 
on target achievement, that tends to accompany empowerment initiatives.   
 
 
Performance measures may also be utilised interactively (Simons, 1995; 2000). 
Compared to diagnostic control which emphasises predictable goal achievement 
(Johnson and Gill, 1993), interactive control is designed to encourage creativity and 
innovation (Simons, 1995), alongside discussions about strategic uncertainties (Bisbe 
and Otley, 2004; Simons, 1995). Interactive control expands opportunity-seeking and 
learning throughout the organization, and allows subordinates to challenge 
assumptions about action plans (Simons, 2000; Widener, 2007). 
 
We suggest that utilising performances measures interactively will be associated with 
increasing RA. As interactive control allows for the revision of objectives and 
assumptions (Simons, 2000), questions arise about role goals, objectives and 
assumptions, by how much any should be revised, and, consequently, which actions 
may lead to a favourable evaluation. Such uncertainties contribute to RA (Kahn et al., 
1964). In addition, Simons (2005) acknowledges the problems that can be associated 
with selecting an inappropriate strategic uncertainty as the focus of management 
attention (Simons, 2005). Interactive control is therefore more ambiguous than 
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diagnostic control. The learning and adaptation enabled by interactive control 
(Abernethy and Brownell, 1999; Simons, 2005) may further increase subjectivity and 
undermine role clarity. This point is reinforced if we consider the preferences 
expressed by managers for precise performance metrics and instructions on what is 
necessary to achieve success (Covaleski, Dirsmith, Heian and Samuel, 1998: 317). 
Interactive networks imply the use of cross boundary teams (e.g. multifunctional 
project teams), and a focus on innovative processes (Simons, 2005). These are sources 
of RA (King and King, 1990). Interactive control demands subjective performance 
evaluation (Simons, 2000), further increasing RA. 
 
There is no basis supported by the available management accounting literature for 
predicting a clear, unidirectional effect of interactive control on PE. We maintain 
consistency by hypothesising a negative impact but return to the arguments in the 
discussion and conclusion section. The arguments presented so far in this section can 
be summarised as follows: 
H5: Diagnostic utilisation of performance measures is negatively related to role 
ambiguity 
 
H6: Diagnostic utilisation of performance measures is positively related to the four 
dimensions of psychological empowerment 
 
H7: Interactive utilisation of performance measures is positively related to role 
ambiguity 
 
H8: Interactive utilisation of performance measures is negatively related to the four 
dimensions of psychological empowerment 
 
2.6. Role ambiguity, psychological empowerment and performance 
Prior research is consistent in showing an inverse relationship between RA and 
managerial performance (see e.g. Dunk, 1993; Hall, 2008; Jackson and Schuler, 1985; 
Marginson and Ogden, 2005a; Tubre and Collins, 2000). The key theoretical 
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argument is that a lack of information regarding goals can result in effort which is 
inefficient, misdirected and/or insufficient for the role, thus reducing performance 
(Hall, 2008: 5; Tubre and Collins, 2000). In line with this analysis, we hypothesise:     
H9: Role ambiguity is negatively related to managerial performance 
 
The following summarises Hall‟s (2008: 147-8) comprehensive review that supports a 
positive relationship between PE and performance: (1) individuals who perceive that 
they can „make a difference‟ are more likely to have an impact, and thus be more 
effective; (2) people who feel competent tend to be more likely to act competently; (3) 
both impact and competence result in more effort and persistence in the face of 
difficulties; (4) individuals who attach more meaning to their work, exert more effort, 
are more committed to their tasks, and are thus more likely to persist in the face of 
difficulties and setbacks than individuals who attach less meaning to their work; and 
(5) work performance is enhanced if managers believe they have autonomy over how 
their work is to be accomplished. In summary, higher levels of PE are associated with 
effort intensity, effort duration, and flexibility. These behaviours enhance 
performance and lead to the following hypothesis. 
 
H10: The four dimensions of psychological empowerment are positively related to 
managerial performance 
 
Our hypotheses are summarised in figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 presents model 1 and 
shows the hypothesised relationships between financial and non-financial 
performance measures, role ambiguity, the dimensions of psychological 
empowerment, and managerial performance. Figure 2 presents model 2 and shows the 




INSERT FIGURES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE 
3.Method 
3.1.Context and sample 
We tested our hypotheses within the telecommunications industry, drawing 
respondents from Newcom
1
, a major organization within this globalised industry.  
The study of Newcom is particularly apposite to developing our understanding of the 
potential psychologically functional role that performance measures may play in 
managers‟ work experiences. Exploratory interviews revealed an emphasis on 
empowerment and the use of non-financial performance measurement to help the 
company maintain a high rate of strategic adaptation and change in the context of 
intense competition which endangers firms‟ short-term survival (Dutton, Ashford, 
O‟Neil, Hayes and Wierba, 1997).  
 
The use of a single firm for the sample is both a strength and a weakness. While 
limiting our ability to make claims for generalizability, single site research enables us 
to assume consistency of factors which may independently affect the behaviour of 
respondents. The factors which remain consistent across the present analysis include: 
organizational size and competencies, design and operation of financial and non-
financial performance measurement and reward systems, and organizational strategy. 
Drawing respondents from a single organization is not uncommon in the literature. 
For example, Brownell (1981), Hopwood (1972), Otley (1978), and Marginson and 
Ogden (2005a) have all drawn on single organization settings to examine the use of 
(financial) performance measures. 
 
                                               
1
 A fictitious name is used to respect confidentiality. 
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Data were collected via a questionnaire survey distributed to middle and senior 
managers of Newcom. 284 questionnaires were distributed electronically and 98 
usable responses were obtained. The response rate was 34.5%. We tested for non-
response bias, drawing on the familiar assumption that non-respondents are more 
likely to be similar to late respondents than early respondents (Fowler, 1993). A two-
sample t-test revealed significant differences in mean values for two variables: age 
(p<0.05) and diagnostic use of non-financial measures (p<0.05). Given the 
importance of the latter to the present study, the analysis to follow was also conducted 
using the separate groups of early versus late respondents. No significantly different 
results were found compared to the composite group of respondents. 
 
Questionnaire instruments were pre-tested and piloted prior to the main study. Two of 
the research team who were not involved in developing the questionnaire were asked 
to assess the questionnaire instruments for ambiguity, style of question and length. 
The revised questionnaire was distributed to MBA students studying in the USA and 
in New Zealand. 45 completed questionnaires were returned in total from these two 
groups. Responses were analysed using confirmatory factor analysis, scaling, and 
correlation analysis. Comments made by respondents were also reviewed. These 
processes led to the research instruments being revised. The final versions of the 
instruments are described below. 
 
3.2.Variable measurement 
We used Henri‟s (2006) adapted version of Vandenbosch‟s (1999) instruments to 
measure respondents‟ utilisation of financial and non-financial measures both 
diagnostically and interactively (with minor changes to wording being introduced 
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after pilot testing). Separate instruments for financial and non-financial measures were 
developed. Each instrument comprises 11 items, with four items representing 
diagnostic use and seven items representing interactive use (items 1 – 11, Appendix).  
 
We measured RA using House and Rizzo‟s (1970) multi-item role stressor instrument. 
This instrument has generally superseded the original 15-item Kahn et al. (1964) 
instrument (see Elovainio and Kivimäki, 2001: 86) which was developed to measure 
role stress along three dimensions: role ambiguity, role conflict, and role overload 
(Kahn et al., 1964). The House and Rizzo‟s instrument comprises six items 
representing RA, and eight items devised to measure role conflict. We omitted one of 
the items for role conflict from the questionnaire on the grounds of irrelevance to 
Newcom. To confirm RA as a distinct role stressor, we conducted principal 
component factor analysis with varimax rotation on our 13-item role stressor 
instrument. Results are presented in Table 1. They reveal a three factor solution. The 
six items for RA load onto a single factor (Factor 1). The RA items are shown in the 
Appendix (see items 12 – 17). Two items were eliminated, as only items loading 
above 0.50 were retained (all six role ambiguity items are presented in the Appendix). 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
PE is measured using Spreitzer‟s (1995) twelve-item scale, with three items for each 
empowerment dimension: impact, competence, meaning, and self determination (see 
items 18 – 29 in the Appendix).  Respondents were asked to indicate on a 5-point 
scale the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with each item. Items 19, 26 and 29 




We measured managerial performance using a two-item instrument (items 30/31 in 
the Appendix)
2
. One of these two items draws directly on the frequently used 
Mahoney, Jerdee and Carroll (1965) measure, and asked respondents to assess their 
recent performance (scale: 1 = performance is barely satisfactory, 7 = performance is 
very good). The other is a comparative measure based on Marginson and Ogden 
(2005a). We asked respondents to indicate the extent to which they regarded their 
performance as below average or above average (scale: 1 = well below average, 7 = 
well above average). The use of self-report measures of performance is consistent 
with prior research (Chalos and Poon, 2000; Chong and Chong, 2002; Hall, 2008; 
Marginson and Ogden, 2005; Otley and Pollanen, 2000). We added our two items 
together to form a composite measure of performance. 
 
We included control variables in our two models to reduce the possibility that 
demographic characteristics might confound responses. Three demographic 
characteristics were measured and controlled for: age, gender, and level of education. 
These may influence managerial beliefs, values, opinions, and actions (e.g. Fulk, 1993; 
Tabachnick and Fidell, 1989), and may thus influence the responses obtained. We also 
controlled for hierarchical level, given the argument that authority increases with 
seniority, thereby potentially influencing feelings of empowerment.  
 
Partial least squares regression 
We test our hypotheses using partial least squares (PLS) regression (Barclay et al., 
1995; Chin, 1998; Fornell and Larcker, 1981; Hartmann, 2005; Sholihin and Pike, 
2009; Wold, 1985). PLS is a multivariate technique that can be used for examining 
                                               
2 Size of the performance measurement instrument was dictated, in part, by restrictions placed on 
overall questionnaire length by Newcom‟s senior managers.   
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complex problems (Hartmann, Naranjo-Gil and Perego, 2010). The technique 
comprises a measurement model and a structural model. The former is akin to 
principle component factor analysis, and specifies relations between manifest items 
and latent constructs. The latter is similar to ordinary least squares regression, and 
specifies relations between latent constructs (Hartmann, 2005). PLS is particularly 
useful for this study, as the technique makes minimal data assumptions and is robust 




4.Analysis and results 
Measurement model  
We first assessed the reliability and validity of the PLS measurement model for the 
full dataset relevant to our analysis (i.e. the full dataset that incorporates model 1, 
relationships based upon financial and non-financial measures, and model 2, 
relationships based upon diagnostic and interactive controls). We examine: (1) 
individual item reliabilities, (2) convergent reliability of the measures associated with 
individual constructs, and (3) discriminant validity.   
 
Item reliability is considered adequate where factor loadings exceed 0.50 (Hulland, 
1999). One item for Impact loaded below 0.50 and was deleted following an item 
trimming process (Hartmann et al., 2010). Table 2 presents the factor loadings for the 
final measurement model. The table shows that, except for financial performance 
measures (where diagnostic and interactive load as a single construct), all items load 
higher on the construct they intend to measure than on any other construct.  
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
                                               
3 PLS analysis has become an accepted statistical tool in management accounting research. Given the 
now many explanations of PLS in the literature, we refer the reader to notable examples, rather than 




We assess convergent reliability using Cronbach‟s alphas (Hulland, 1999). These are 
reported in Table 3. In all cases (except for performance), alpha scores exceed 0.80, 
which demonstrates acceptable reliability (Nunally, 1978). At 0.622, reliability for the 
performance measure is relatively low, but still acceptable. Further evidence of 
reliability of the performance measure is provided by the findings. As will be shown, 
these are consistent with Hall (2008), in revealing that psychological variables (in our 
case RA and PE) moderate the relationship between performance measures and 
performance. 
 
Discriminent validity is considered to be satisfactory where the average variance 
extracted (AVE) by the latent constructs from their manifest variables exceeds 0.50 
(Fornell and Larcker 1981 – ex Hartmann et al. 2010). AVE should also exceed the 
squared correlation between the construct and other constructs in the model for 
discriminant validity to be sufficient (Barclay et al. 1995 – ex Hartmann et al. 2010). 
Table 3 shows that AVE values are adequate except for RA, for which AVE is 
marginal at 0.48. Table 3 also shows that the square roots of the AVEs (diagonal) all 
exceed the respective correlations between constructs.  
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Test of hypotheses  
The results for the measurement model shown in Table 2 confirm a distinction 
between diagnostic and interactive control for non-financial performance measures, 
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but not for financial performance measures. Table 2 also shows a marginal AVE value 




First, we re-ran our PLS analysis after removing items relating to both financial 
interactive and non-financial interactive. Doing so enabled us to directly compare 
financial versus non-financial measures, with diagnostic control as the focus
5
. We 
focus on diagnostic control for comparing financial and non-financial measures, given 
it has been suggested that “virtually all writing on management control refers to 
diagnostic control systems” (Simons, 1995: 60). This analysis provides a direct test of 
hypotheses 1 – 4 (model 1).  
 
Results for the revised measurement model show adequacy in terms of item reliability, 
convergent validity and discriminant validity
6
. Results for our structural model are 
reported in Table 4. Structural models in PLS regression are evaluated by examining 
the proportion of explained variance of the endogenous variables (i.e. R
2
 values), 
together with the size of the structural path coefficients (Hartmann et al., 2010). 
Regarding these, Table 4 suggests the following: that both financial and non-financial 
measures are significantly related to RA (H1 is supported; results are contrary to H3); 
partial support for the idea that performance measures affect levels of PE (non-
financial measures are shown to be significantly related to self-determination, and, at 
                                               
4 The results for a structural model consistent with the reported measurement model (i.e. containing 
financial PMS, diagnostic use of non-financial PMS and interactive use of non-financial PMS) support 
the findings presented in the paper. We proceed in the way reported to ensure that the requirements for 
PLS are fully met in our reported results. 
5 We also repeated the testing of hypotheses 1 – 4 by removing items relating to both financial 
diagnostic and non-financial diagnostic and conducting the analysis based on the items for interactive 
utilisation. In this instance, results show a significant relationship between non-financial measures and, 
except for impact, all dimensions of PE. All other results are similar to those shown in Table 4.   
6 For reasons of brevity, results for the revised measurement model are omitted from the paper, but are 
available on request.  
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p < 0.1, impact and competence); and that both RA and PE are significantly related to 
performance (H9 and H10 are supported).  
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Second, given the lack of differentiation for financial measures as shown in Table 2, 
we removed all items relating to financial measures and used diagnostic versus 
interactive utilisation of non-financial measures as the basis for testing hypotheses 5 – 
8 for model 2. Again, the revised measurement model reveals adequacy in terms of 
item reliability, convergent validity and discriminant validity. Results for the 
structural model are shown in Table 5. Table 5 shows that interactive utilisation of 
non-financial performance measures decreases RA and increases PE. This is contrary 
to our hypotheses (H7 and H8). Diagnostic utilisation of non-financial measures 
affects only RA (supporting H5, but not H6). Results confirm the reported 
associations between RA, PE and performance, as per model 1 and hypotheses 9 and 
10. Across both the structural models, results suggest that performance measure 
utilisation is indirectly related to managerial performance through the effects on RA 
and PE.  No direct effect is observed (although Table 3 reports significant zero-order 
correlations). 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
5.Discussion and conclusions 
In contrast to the longstanding tradition, an emerging literature suggests that financial 
measures may play a positive psychological role in managers‟ work experiences 
(Hartmann, 2005; 2007; Marginson and Ogden, 2005a,b; Marginson, 2006). Defining 
a positive psychological effect in terms of reduced role ambiguity (RA) and increased 
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psychological empowerment (PE), we have drawn upon goal theory and the existing 
management accounting literature to explore this possibility and to hypothesise that: 
(1) financial (rather than non-financial) measures generate a positive psychological 
experience, and (2) diagnostic utilisation (rather than interactive utilisation) of 
performance measures generates a positive psychological experience. These 
hypotheses provide theoretical grounding for Marginson and Ogden‟s (2005a, b) 
suggestion that positive psychological effects follow from the clear, concise and 
unambiguous indicators of performance provided by financial measures. They 
contradict Hall‟s (2008) argument that positive effects are due to the more complete 
and richer information about operations and results that is associated with 
comprehensive PMS that incorporates non-financial measures. We followed the 
established orthodoxy and hypothesised that a positive psychological experience will 
increase managerial performance. 
 
Our results support the emerging literature that argues in favour of a positive effect of 
the use of financial measures. More broadly, we find a positive impact of both 
financial and non-financial PMS; and, therefore, we do not find that non-financial 
measures overcome deficiencies that are inherent in financial measures. Nor do we 
find that diagnostic utilisation of PMS creates effects that are opposite to interactive 
utilisation, although we do find differences. Our findings support a subtle 
interpretation of Simon‟s (1995, pp 7-8) contention that positive impacts arise from 
the dynamic tension between the “yin” and “yang” of PMS (see Mundy, 2010); and 
point away from the dynamic interaction of opposing forces of diagnostic and 
25 
 
interactive control that provides the basis for our hypothesis formation
7
. In reinforcing 
the possibility that PMS creates positive effects, results for the relationship between 
RA, PE and performance are clear and consistent. For the two models of (1) financial 
versus non-financial measures and (2) diagnostic versus interactive utilisation of PMS, 
we find an increasing positive psychological experience to be associated with higher 
levels of managerial performance. Our analysis suggests that managers‟ psychological 
experience plays an important intervening role in determining how performance 
measurement might (indirectly) affect performance.  
 
RA is defined as “uncertainty about what an occupant of a particular office is 
supposed to do” (Katz and Kahn, 1978, p. 206), where uncertainty creates the need for 
increased information (Galbraith, 1974). Our findings suggest that RA is reduced by 
both financial and non-financial measures and both diagnostic and interactive 
utilisation. Our findings therefore support the intuition that financial measures and 
non-financial measures, used diagnostically and interactively, are efficacious sources 
of information to counteract RA (and therefore increase role clarity). 
 
Our findings are consistent with the argument that information is a source of PE 
(Conger and Kanungo, 1988). We clarify the existing literature by showing that non-
financial measures in particular support PE and that the interactive use of non-
financial measures is crucial to their effect. In this respect our findings are consistent 
with the literature that argues that it is the way in which measures are used, rather than 
                                               
7
 Simons (1995; 2000) argues that combining diagnostic and interactive controls creates positive 
„fruitful dynamic tensions‟ (Lillis, 2002). Henri (2006) examines this through the use of interaction 
terms. To explore the psychological effects of combining diagnostic and interactive utilisation, we 
introduced interaction terms into model 2 and repeated the PLS analysis. All relevant correlation 
coefficients are non-significant. This suggests that combining diagnostic and interactive utilisation does 
not generate psychological effects, positive or otherwise. 
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the measures themselves, which create impact (Hopwood, 1972; Veen-Dirks, 2009; 
Marginson et al., 2010). Our findings therefore extend the contributions of Marginson 
and Ogden (2005 a,b) and Hall (2008) because neither of these studies considered the 
ways in which PMS are used. 
 
We offer two explanations for our findings based upon aspects of goal theory that 
transcend the arguments presented in our hypothesis section. First, we can explain 
differences in our results for financial and non-financial measures through the goal 
theory argument that commitment to goals is critical, particularly when goals are 
difficult, and that high commitment depends upon individuals being convinced that a 
goal is important (Locke and Latham1990). Conviction about the importance of a goal 
can be increased where senior managers provide reasons that support the goal 
(Latham, Erez and Locke, 1988). For Newcom, discussions with senior managers 
suggested that (1) financial measures were accorded low priority following 
experiences consistent with the dysfunctional consequences extensively outlined 
within the literature (see the opening paragraph of this paper); and (2) the senior 
management team was stressing the use of non-financial measures over financial 
measures in its pursuit of a policy based upon the principles of beyond budgeting 
(Hope and Fraser, 2003). Given these observations, the salience of goals represented 
by non-financial measures was amplified and therefore might have been expected to 
give rise to a significant effect because of their organisational legitimacy relative to 
financial measures. 
 
Our second explanation for our results draws upon House‟s (1996) description of the 
alternative ways in which goals might be clarified to address the question of why our 
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results differed from our hypotheses with regard to interactive controls. House‟s 
analysis includes the encouragement of subordinate involvement and the interpersonal 
interactions that are associated with interactive controls (Simons, 1995; 2005). By 
encouraging discussion and debate, interactive utilisation may help to reduce RA and 
to promote PE. The face-to-face interactions that are central to interactive control 
(Simons, 1995) are appropriate for ambiguous situations (Daft and Lengel, 1986; 
1990). RA is reduced through the process of face-to-face dialogue that may lead to 
agreement about how to cope with uncertainties (Daft and Lengel, 1990). In terms of 
PE, the benefit to be derived from the use of performance measures may apply only or 
primarily to interactive utilisation. Results shown in Table 5 suggest that diagnostic 
utilisation has little if any effect on PE. Our findings suggest that encouraging face to 
face discussions, and encouraging continual challenge and debate of underlying 
assumptions and data, interactive utilisation can promote a greater sense of, for 
instance, competence and meaning.  Based on the findings, it appears that examining 
the potential functional role that performance measurement may play in managers‟ 
work experiences may offer a potentially fruitful and important line of future enquiry 
where research further clarifies the roles of interactive and diagnostic control. 
 
The exploratory nature of our study implies that there are limitations which future 
research can address. First, the generalizability of the study is limited by the use of 
respondents from a single organization. There is a research opportunity to be gained 
from examining the hypotheses across a range of organizations. Second is the 
limitation that both reverse causality and endogeneity may apply; unobserved 
variables may affect both RA and PE, which in turn may cause managers to utilise 
financial and non-financial measures both diagnostically and interactively. In 
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particular, we did not address the question of supervisory style, for which existing 
instruments are available (Hartmann, 2010). Third, the dynamic and potentially subtle 
nature of the association between PMS, RA and PE suggests a need to differentiate 
between the consequences/manifestation of „attitude‟ and the effects of „action‟. For 
instance, increasing RA may give rise to a more positive attitude towards PMS, as 
demonstrated through increased budgetary commitment (Marginson and Ogden, 
2005a). At the same time, utilisation of performance information and performance 
measures may serve to reduce RA (Marginson, 2006). Subtleties such as this suggest a 
need for a longitudinal analysis of the interplay between RA, PE and PMS over time, 
so that we may better understand the dynamics of this relationship. Fourth, our two-
item measure of performance yields a low Cronbach alpha, although results are 
consistent with prior research (Hall, 2008), and alternative measures, including 
measures based upon superior‟s evaluations of subordinate‟s performance, may 
improve the rigour of future studies. Finally, we did not consider other ways in which 
performance measures may be utilised, and how this may affect the psychological 
impact that financial and non-financial measures may have at the individual level. Our 
results suggest that manner of utilisation may be key to understanding how 
management control systems may fulfil a positive psychological role. Nevertheless, 
we cannot disregard the possibility that other forms of use may have psychological 
consequences. Our theoretical framing centred on the feedback function of PMS as a 
means to track progress towards goals, which focuses upon scorekeeping (Locke, 
1996), but scorekeeping must be seen alongside attention directing and problem 
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Financial targets and non-financial measures 
 
The following wording was used as a framework from which to establish separate 
instruments for financial and non-financial measures: 
 
Rubric on the questionnaire 
 
The statements below relate to financial (non-financial) targets. Using the scale shown 
below, please rate the extent to which you currently use financial (non-financial) 
targets to: 
 
Scale: 1 (Not at all) – 5 (To a great extent) 
 
Diagnostic use (this wording was not shown on the questionnaire and diagnostic and 
interactive items were listed randomly) 
 
1. Track progress towards goals 
2. Monitor results 
3. Compare outcomes to expectations 
4. Review key measures 
 
Interactive use (this wording was not shown on the questionnaire and diagnostic and 
interactive items were listed randomly) 
 
5. Encourage discussions in meetings* 
6. Encourage continual challenge and debate of underlying data, assumptions and 
action plans 
7. Provide a common view of the organization 
8. Tie the organization together 
9. Enable your area to focus on common issues* 
10. Develop a common vocabulary in your area* 
11. Enable your area to focus on critical success factors* 
 
















Role ambiguity  
 
Rubric on the questionnaire 
 
The following statements describe how people may feel about their work situation. 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each item using the 
following scale: 
 
Scale: 1 (Strongly agree) – 5 (Strongly disagree) 
 
12. I know that I have divided my time properly 
13. I have clear, planned goals and objectives for my job 
14. I know what my responsibilities are 
15. I feel certain about how much authority I have 
16. I know exactly what is expected of me 
17. Explanation is clear what has to be done 
 
 
Psychological empowerment  
 
Rubric on the questionnaire 
 
The following statements describe how people may feel about their work. Please 
indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each using the following scale: 
 




18. My impact on what happens in my department/unit is large* 
19. I have little control over what happens in my department/unit* 




21. I am confident about my ability to do my job 
22. I am self-assured about my capabilities to perform my work activities 




24. The work I do is meaningful to me 
25. My job activities are personally meaningful to me 











27. I have significant autonomy in determining how I do my job 
28. I can decide on my own how to go about doing my work 
29. I have little opportunity for independence and freedom in how I do my job* 
 
*The wording of these statements was adjusted to fit the circumstances. The changes 







Rubric on the questionnaire 
 




Performance is   Performance   Performance is 
barely satisfactory   is adequate   extremely good 
 
 




31.How do you think you compare as a manager with other managers at the same 
level as you? Taking everything into consideration, would you consider yourself: 
 
 
Well below    Average   Well above 
  Average           average   
 




















Figure 1: Hypothesised relations involving financial versus non-

















































Table 1: Factor analysis results for role ambiguity 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of sampling adequacy: 0.816  
 
C = Measures for role conflict 
A = Measures for role ambiguity 
 
*These items were eliminated from the analysis 
 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Communalities 
C. Do things differently  0.069  0.740  0.177  0.584 
C. Work on unnecessary things -0.327  0.627  0.361  0.630 
C. Assignment without resources -0.049  0.764  0.287  0.668 
C. Incompatible requests  0.053  0.595  0.460  0.569 
C. Groups operating differently  0.111  0.141  0.751  0.597 
C. Break rules to carry out assignment -0.412  0.334  0.507  0.538 
C. Do things differentially accepted  -0.342  0.168  0.594  0.498 
A. Certain about amount of authority*  0.390 -0.640  0.329  0.671 
A. Clear, planned goals and objectives  0.768  0.055 -0.125  0.608 
A. Know divided time properly  0.726 -0.022 -0.150  0.551 
A. Know responsibilities  0.769 -0.215  0.038  0.638 
A. Know exactly what is expected  0.700 -0.433  0.086  0.685 
A. Explanation clear of what to do*  0.414 -0.411 -0.089  0.348 
Eigen values  4.59  1.87  1.12  




Factor loadings from final measurement model 
 
Item Fin NFI NFD Com Self Mean Imp RA Perf 
Fin1 0.807 0.350 0.473 0.225 0.241 0.089 0.152 0.331 0.209 
Fin2 0.822 0.402 0.392 0.263 0.206 0.145 0.177 0.305 0.225 
Fin3 0.785 0.374 0.441 0.196 0.168 0.195 0.214 0.287 0.187 
Fin4 0.795 0.411 0.483 0.240 0.221 0.236 0.188 0.324 0.278 
Fin5 0.818 0.429 0.375 0.199 0.256 0.176 0.220 0.358 0.254 
Fin6 0.836 0.334 0.413 0.283 0.187 0.234 0.207 0.311 0.179 
Fin7 0.775 0.353 0.524 0.135 0.246 0.240 0.159 0.268 0.213 
Fin8 0.829 0.317 0.368 0.205 0.190 0.266 0.192 0.337 0.236 
Fin9 0.780 0.406 0.490 0.276 0.223 0.187 0.231 0.380 0.158 
Fin10 0.779 0.386 0.431 0.219 0.184 0.278 0.248 0.341 0.208 
Fin11 0.830 0.452 0.316 0.297 0.208 0.255 0.139 0.310 0.134 
NFI1 0.221 0.744 0.395 0.424 0.447 0.506 0.376 0.428 0.188 
NFI2 0.175 0.690 0.481 0.495 0.426 0.437 0.355 0.416 0.244 
NFI3 0.239 0.754 0.354 0.386 0.403 0.421 0.389 0.390 0.220 
NFI4 0.190 0.760 0.303 0.410 0.512 0.447 0.366 0.408 0.264 
NFI5 0.228 0.735 0.447 0.444 0.437 0.367 0.351 0.362 0.190 
NFI6 0.188 0.729 0.323 0.307 0.481 0.509 0.277 0.419 0.255 
NFI7 0.230 0.732 0.411 0.293 0.519 0.380 0.332 0.355 0.262 
NFD1 0.168 0.450 0.745 0.286 0.300 0.271 0.226 0.378 0.207 
NFD2 0.254 0.396 0.707 0.294 0.258 0.334 0.289 0.412 0.230 
NFD3 0.219 0.415 0.693 0.326 0.360 0.291 0.345 0.437 0.212 
NFD4 0.263 0.175 0.735 0.270 0.359 0.320 0.274 0.391 0.170 
Com1 0.216 0.245 0.217 0.800 0.441 0.378 0.519 0.378 0.079 
Com2 0.301 0.178 0.231 0.865 0.498 0.334 0.403 0.463 0.275 
Com3 0.154 0.206 0.294 0.731 0.343 0.415 0.447 0.521 0.116 
Self1 0.228 0.399 0.215 0.368 0.773 0.479 0.486 0.432 0.309 
Self2 0.263 0.378 0.087 0.310 0.742 0.307 0.497 0.331 0.123 
Self3 0.287 0.241 0.273 0.439 0.746 0.517 0.342 0.350 0.206 
Mean1 0.319 0.423 0.247 0.322 0.432 0.752 0.543 0.291 0.134 
Mean2 0.266 0.329 0.202 0.364 0.189 0.737 0.451 0.287 0.272 
Mean3 0.275 0.301 0.228 0.374 0.403 0.812 0.505 0.340 0.251 
Imp1 0.328 0.330 0.231 0.341 0.420 0.558 0.761 0.294 0.378 
Imp2 0.292 0.404 0.323 0.481 0.329 0.476 0.722 0.355 0.247 
RA1 0.311 0.349 0.364 0.453 0.351 0.426 0.442 0.684 0.322 
RA2 0.233 0.386 0.297 0.389 0.462 0.440 0.397 0.671 0.373 
RA3 0.263 0.412 0.347 0.433 0.395 0.387 0.333 0.707 0.297 
RA4 0.303 0.373 0.241 0.468 0.409 0.323 0.423 0.715 0.241 
Perf1 0.336 0.413 0.375 0.197 0.233 0.350 0.400 0.445 0.694 
Perf2 0.380 0.289 0.413 0.225 0.274 0.402 0.256 0.357 0.746 
          
 
Fin = financial performance measures; NFI = non-financial interactive; NFD = non-
financial diagnostic; Com = competence; Self = self-determination; Mean = meaning; 






Descriptive statistics (based on full measurement model) 
 
Variable Mean SD TR AR CA AVE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1.RA   8.28 2.28 4-20 4-13 0.78 0.48   0.68         
2.Financial 14.79 4.36 11-55 11-50 0.95 0.65 -0.23   0.80        
3.Nonfindiag 15.96 2.72 4-20 6-20 0.87 0.52 -0.32   0.72    0.72       
4.Nonfininter 27.84 4.77 7-35 14-35 0.90 0.54 -0.27   0.69    0.66   0.73      
5.Impact   3.55 1.43 2-10 2-8 0.70 0.55   0.46   0.05 -0.36 -0.39   0.74     
6.Compet.   5.30 1.67 3-15 3-13 0.77 0.64   0.41 -0.08 -0.18 -0.27   0.31   0.80    
7.Meaning   4.97 1.99 3-15 3-10 0.80 0.59   0.49 -0.13 -0.24 -0.30   0.36   0.20   0.77   
8.Self-detm.   5.04 1.89 3-15 3-10 0.78 0.57   0.35 -0.22 -0.25 -0.31   0.42   0.18   0.48  0.75  
9. Perform. 10.61 1.27 2-14 7-14 0.62 0.52 -0.48   0.13   0.19   0.28 -0.29 -0.30 -0.57 -0.40  0.72 
 
TR =  Theoretical range 
AR =  Actual range 
CA =  Cronbach Alpha 
AVE =  Average variance extracted 
RA =  Role ambiguity (four items) 
Financial = Financial measures, diagnostic + interactive (model 1) 
NFinancial = Non-financial measures, diagnostic + interactive (model 1) 
Nonfindiag = Diagnostic utilisation of non-financial measures (model 2) 
Nonfininter = Interactive utilisation of non-financial measures (model 2) 
Impact  = Two-item measure of impact 
Compet. = Competence 
Meaning = Meaning 
Self-detm = Self-determination 
Perform. = Managerial performance 
Correlations above 0.20 significant at p < 0.05 (Pearson correlation coefficients reported, off-diagonal elements) 







PLS results for model 1: financial vis-à-vis non-financial (diagnostic utilisation 
the focus) 
 
                                                                   Paths to: 
 
                             RA         Impact      Competence  Meaning   Self-determ  Perform        
 
                                              Adjusted R
2
 for endogenous variables  






















































































































n = 98.  
Each cell reports the path coefficient (t-value). 
Blank cells indicate that the path was not hypothesised within the model. We report 
the results for the relationship between RA and PE, given the relevance to model 1.  
 
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001 (two-tailed) 
 
a
We report significance at p< 0.1, through this superscript, to retain consistency with 








PLS results for model 2: diagnostic vis-à-vis interactive utilisation (non-financial 
measures the focus) 
 
                                                                   Paths to: 
 
                             RA          Impact     Competence  Meaning   Self-determ   Perform        
 
                                              Adjusted R
2
 for endogenous variables  






















































































































n = 98. 
Each cell reports the path coefficient (t-value). 
Blank cells indicate that the path was not hypothesised within the model. We report 
the results for the relationship between RA and PE, given the relevance to model 2. 
 
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001 (two-tailed) 
 
a
We report ignificance at p< 0.1, through this superscript, to retain consistency with 







For tables 4 and 5: 
 
Perform =  managerial performance 
RA =   role ambiguity 
Self-determ =  self-determination 
NonFdiag =  diagnostic utilisation of non-financial measures 
NonFinter =  interactive utilisation of non-financial measures 
 
Regarding the results shown in tables 4 and 5, the negative sign for the main effects is 
consistent with expectations and the questionnaire design, in that increasing 
psychological empowerment is denoted by a lower score, while increasing utilisation 
of performance measures is denoted by a higher score. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
